4-14-2026 The War in Iran (On Peace Negotiations)
As of writing this post on 4/14/2026, the war in Iran continues. The latest official news is that this latest round of negotiations, the “highest-level negotiations since 1979” between the Iranian government and the US have failed after about 24 hours.
This is not necessarily surprising. The US and Iran were in the midst of negotiations regarding the development of nuclear weapons when this war started, a particularly despicable and, sadly, recurring American stratagem (recall the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020 when he was lured to a location by the prospect of negotiations before being killed) utilized by the current administration.
The ability of Israel and the US to attack Iran without militarily meaningful consequences in return shows that the only long-term form of military deterrence that Iran can hope for is the development of nuclear weapons, as ascending to that upper echelon of nuclear powers, in combination with a robust missile program, would preclude further military adventurism against it. The overt hostility between Iran and the US/Israel since 1979 (for the duration of the post-Revolution government’s existence), and numerous examples of nuclear powers’ military aggression towards their non-nuclear victims (eg. US and Iraq, Russia and Ukraine, Russia and Georgia, proxy wars in Libya and Syria) have made it abundantly clear that the development of nuclear weapons is in the self-interest of the current Iranian government.
The Iranians have also suffered tremendously in this war that they did not start: the assassination of many of their members of government, the deaths of thousands of their countrymen, the destruction of much of their military industrial capacity, and damage to their oil industry. Because of this harm they’ve suffered, there is a strong incentive to come away from negotiations appearing to have gained significant concessions from the US.
Conversely, continuation of the conflict is not likely to significantly threaten the ability of the current Iranian government to remain in power, as it is clear that there is reticence on the part of the Americans (and an inability on the part of the Israelis) to have a ground invasion, and there is no evidence of the necessary degree of troop buildup for a meaningful ground invasion of the Iranian mainland to the extent that can topple the government in power. There also does not seem to be a viable domestic opposition to the current Iranian government with the arms necessary to directly combat even a weakened IRGC. The hope that a weakened government would fall to infighting between the Iranian Army and the IRGC also seems to not have been borne out.
From the American side, there is strong pressure to resolve this conflict. This was a particularly stupid and short-sighted military adventure because it is unclear what possible goals they could have been willing to accomplish while only committing to an (albeit extensive) air campaign.
If the goal was to topple the Iranian regime, the assassination of their leaders is likely to only make them into martyrs and further galvanize the remaining government and their forces, there are countless officials ready to step into these now-vacated roles, and there is no armed-and-ready domestic opposition on the ground that could then overthrow the Iranian regime. If the goal was to prevent the development of nuclear weapons, well diplomacy had thus far succeeded in achieving this goal for the last 40+ years. While an air campaign can destroy infrastructure that is in place, it is not a long-term solution. If the goal was to discourage the use of Iranian proxy militias throughout the Middle East, the disparity in conventional military power between Iran and the US/Israel will only serve to highly the importance of cultivating these proxies to maintaining a threatening geopolitical presence against their enemies (whether it be Israel or Saudi Arabia).
So we can see the war was started by the Americans and Israelis without goals that were clearly achievable with just an air campaign. The risks to this conflict were, on the other hand, completely foreseeable: Iran will use its substantial missile program to hurt the world economy and their neighbors in order to apply pressure to the Americans to stop the conflict. The near-complete cessation of trade through the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s petroleum is transported, has had significant effects on much of the world through rising oil prices leading to inflation.
Ultimately, without committing to a ground invasion, which would be extremely foolhardy, it seems unlikely that the US will emerge from negotiations having achieved much beyond a return to the pre-war status quo (though this will make the current administration look particularly foolish), and there is little incentive for the Iranian government to agree to a peace plan that doesn’t allow them, in the long-run, to preserve the current government, their control over trade in the Strait of Hormuz, and the possibility of developing nuclear weapons in the future.
Two outcomes are likely: in the first, a peace agreement is reached that ends the current conflict and brings Iran back to the pre-war status quo (though admittedly with a much, if temporarily, reduced military-industrial capacity). In this scenario, the US and Israel will have provoked this war without anything meaningful to show for it. The obvious consequences for the US/Israeli axis in this scenario is a tremendous among of international resentment and ill-will for their warmongering as well as the damage they’ve dealt to the global economy.
The second possible outcome is that because American/Israeli and Iranian goals for negotiations are so far apart, no peace agreement is reached in the near future. In this scenario, the war continues: American and Israeli bombing of the Iranian mainland, starting initially with military targets but as the war drags on eventually explicitly targeting the country’s infrastructure and then civilian targets, while Iran continues to utilize its internal apparatus for the suppression of any domestic dissent and uses its missile and drone capabilities to halt trade through the Strait of Hormuz. This halt in trade continues to impact oil prices, which has downstream effects on the prices for essentially all consumer goods (due to costs of manufacturing and transport) as well as energy costs, leading to global inflation and likely, a recession.